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ABSTRACT
While the strategic management literature suggests that related diversi-
fication is superior to unrelated diversification, there is little evidence that
acquirers benefit from pursuing related targets. We argue that the em-
pirical literature is plagued by poor measures of relatedness. Moreover,
many empirical studies do not control adequately for the characteristics of
the market for corporate control. We argue that not only value creation,
but also value appropriation, depend on the relatedness of acquirer and
target. Using an improved measure of relatedness, we provide empirical
evidence that acquirer returns are positively and significantly correlated
with relatedness.
1. INTRODUCTION
Resource-based and capabilities theories of the ﬁrm suggest that diversiﬁ-
cation can add value when the ﬁrm’s activities are closely related (Mont-
gomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Rumelt, 1974;
Wernerfelt, 1984). However, there is little evidence that acquirers beneﬁt
from pursuing related, rather than unrelated, targets (Datta, Pinches, &
Narayanan, 1992; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992; Lubatkin, 1987; Seth, 1990 QA :1;
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Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Sirower, 1997). Some studies even ﬁnd a neg-
ative correlation between acquirer returns and the relatedness of acquirer
and target ( QA :2Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1991). The overall consensus ap-
pears to be that even if relatedness creates value, the additional value is
largely captured by target shareholders, leaving little gain for the acquiring
ﬁrm.
We question this consensus for two reasons. First, relatedness is difﬁcult
to measure. Most studies use the distance between SIC QA :3codes, or the FTC’s
categories of ‘‘product extension,’’ ‘‘market extension,’’ and ‘‘conglomer-
ate,’’ to measure the relatedness of pairs of business units. However, such
measures are not derived from theoretical models of scope, spillovers, ex-
perimentation, or other reasons for diversiﬁcation, and are probably poor
proxies for the kinds of relatedness that matter for value creation (Robins &
Wiersema, 1995, 2003; Markides & Williamson, 1996; Silverman, 1999; Lien
& Klein, 2004, 2005). Second, the acquirer’s returns depend not only on
value creation, but value appropriation, which depends on the character-
istics of the market for corporate control. As explained by Barney (1988),
acquirers beneﬁt from acquisitions when (a) the acquisition creates unique
and valuable synergies, (b) the acquirer has private information about the
combined value of acquirer and target, (c) the acquirer is lucky, or (d) there
are more targets than acquirers. Ignoring luck, we argue that the remaining
three conditions are more likely to obtain in related transactions. Assuming
relatedness is properly measured, then, acquirers pursuing related targets
should be in a better position to appropriate a share of the value created by
the transaction.
The chapter proceeds as follows. We begin by discussing the conditions
under which relatedness creates create value. Next, we evaluate common
measures of relatedness, asking if they are sensitive to these conditions.
Third, we outline the relation between value appropriation and relatedness.
Finally, we supply some preliminary evidence that when an improved
measure of relatedness is substituted for conventional SIC-based measures,
there is a positive and significant relationship between relatedness and ac-
quirer performance.
2. RELATEDNESS AND VALUE CREATION
Do diversifying acquisitions create value? The answer depends on whether
combining particular business activities within a ﬁrm provides performance
advantages unavailable to single-business ﬁrms or ﬁrms with other combi-
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nations of activities. In the resource-based view, value is created when re-
sources useful in one industry are substitutes for, or complements to, re-
sources useful in another industry.1 Substitute resources are those developed
in one industry that is functional substitutes for resources developed in
another industry. Complementary resources exist when there are positive
spillovers between resources used in different industries. Without such
complementarities – either static or dynamic – it is hard to make economic
sense of relatedness.2 However, while substitutability or complementarity
are necessary conditions for relatedness to enhance performance, they are
not sufﬁcient conditions, as we argue below.
2.1. Resource Substitutability
Consider resources that are substitutes across industries (leading to econ-
omies of scope). If resources are perfectly divisible, then substitutability
provides no advantage to a related diversiﬁer. However, if resources are not
perfectly divisible,3 then single-business ﬁrms or unrelated diversiﬁers will be
left with costly excess capacity, which can be exploited through related
diversiﬁcation (Willig, 1979). Penrose (1959) was one of the ﬁrst writers to
relax the assumption of perfect divisibility. She noted that excess capacity
arises not only because some resources are inherently indivisible (e.g., half a
truck is not half as valuable as a truck), but also due to learning; accu-
mulated production generates new resources along with excess capacity in
existing resources. These learning effects, combined with resource in-
divisibilities, suggest that related diversiﬁcation can improve performance
(assuming that unused capacity is costly).
However, as Teece (1980, 1982) points out, while the existence of such
indivisibilities explains joint production, it does not explain why joint pro-
duction must be organized within a single ﬁrm. If the excess capacity created
by indivisibilities can be traded in well functioning markets, single-business
ﬁrms and unrelated diversiﬁers can simply sell or rent out their excess ca-
pacity or buy the capacity they need from others. In other words, absent
transactional difﬁculties, two separate ﬁrms could simply contract to share
the inputs, facilities, or whatever accounts for the relevant scope economies.
If they do not, it must be because the costs of writing or enforcing such a
contract are greater than the beneﬁts from joint production. Whether the
ﬁrms will create value by integrating thus depends on the comparative costs
and beneﬁts of contracting, not on the underlying production technology.
Indeed, if contracting costs are low, the related diversiﬁer may actually
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Relatedness and Acquirer Performance 11
compete at a disadvantage relative to the single-business ﬁrm, because the
diversiﬁed ﬁrm faces the additional bureaucratic costs of low-powered in-
centives, increased complexity, and so on.
2.2. Resource Complementarity
More recent attention has focused not on resource substitutability, but re-
source complementarity (Christensen & Foss, 1997; Foss & Christensen,
2001; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994).
Complementarities exist when investment in one industry increases the value
of resources used in another industry, or when decisions about resource use
in one industry affect similar decisions in another. These positive spillovers
create a quantitative and qualitative coordination problem which may be
best managed within a diversiﬁed ﬁrm (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Ri-
chardson, 1972). As before, to explain why this coordination problem can-
not be solved in the market (i.e., between single-business ﬁrms or unrelated
diversiﬁers), we must appeal to some form of contracting costs. Hence,
transaction costs are also relevant to situations involving complements.
Recently literature emphasizes dynamic complementarities, the ability to
identify new ways of combining existing resources or speed up the devel-
opment of new resources.4 The beneﬁts to similarity in this context arise
because such dynamic complementarities may be greater if the industries in
question share some basic features (March, 1991), or because some common
characteristics facilitate their exploitation (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002;
Prahalad & Bettis, 1985). The degree of dynamic complementarity between
industries thus depends on the balance between variety and similarity
(Christensen & Foss, 1997). Industries with appropriate balances between
variety and similarity produce larger dynamic complementarities than in-
dustries that are too different or too similar. Empirically, this implies that
portfolios of businesses with strong inter-industry complementarities should
be considered related (or, in Teece et al.’s, 1994 language, ‘‘coherent’’), and
that ﬁrms with related activities should outperform ﬁrms with unrelated
combinations of activities and single-business ﬁrms, ceteris paribus (again,
assuming positive contracting costs).
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3. CONVENTIONAL MEASURES OF RELATEDNESS
Most of the empirical work in mergers and acquisitions use either the SIC
system or the FTC’s merger classiﬁcation system to label transactions as
either related or unrelated (conglomerate). The simplest SIC-based measures
label a transaction related if the ﬁrms’ core businesses share the same two-
digit SIC code and unrelated otherwise (e.g., Doukas & Kan, 2004). Other
approaches label transactions related if any of the ﬁrms’ largest businesses
share a four-digit SIC code (e.g, Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). The most
sophisticated versions use distances between SIC codes to compute contin-
uous measures of relatedness. Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002), for exam-
ple, consider up to six lines of businesses for each ﬁrm They assign scores of
two, four, and six if the primary businesses match on the two-digit, three-
digit, and four-digit levels, respectively. Comparison of the secondary busi-
nesses yields scores of one, two, and three for matches on the two-digit,
three-digit, and four-digit levels, respectively.
Such continuous measures have obvious advantages over discrete ones,
not only because the former allow for more sophisticated econometric
analysis, but also because, conceptually, relatedness is a matter of degree.5
Even these SIC-based measures are problematic, however. One problem is
that the SIC’s four-digit system allows only four levels of distance. No
matter how the weighting scheme is devised, the four available distance
categories are different two-digit SIC codes, same two-digit SIC codes, same
three-digit SIC codes, and same four-digit SIC codes.6 The underlying dis-
tance measure is in other words not truly continuous. In effect, this imposes
the rather brave assumption that any pair of industries equally distant
within the SIC hierarchy are equally dissimilar.
However, the most serious problem with measures based on SIC codes is
that these measures do not capture indivisibilities and transaction costs, the
conditions under which relatedness creates value. Because these conditions
are not incorporated into conventional measures of relatedness, these meas-
ures will tend to exaggerate relatedness in cases where resources are close
substitutes but these additional conditions are not met. Moreover, as
pointed out by Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) and Foss and Christensen
(2001), SIC-based procedures have an implicit bias toward economies of
scope and against dynamic complementarities, suggesting that speciﬁc types
of relatedness are systematically underestimated. For these reasons, even the
best SIC-based measures have serious limitations for studying relatedness
and value creation.
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Relatedness and Acquirer Performance 13
Evidence of these problems can be observed in the data on diversiﬁcation.
A good measure of diversiﬁcation patterns is the frequency with which a
given pair of industries is combined inside a ﬁrm, compared to what one
would expect if diversiﬁcation patterns were random (Teece et al., 1994).
Assuming that ﬁrms tend to combine industries that are related, this dif-
ference can be interpreted as a measure of relatedness. If the difference is
large and positive, then the industries in question are closely related. If the
difference is negative, then the industries are unrelated. Table 1 provides this
measure for all four-digit industry pairs that were combined within ﬁrms
during the 1980s. Our source is the AGSM/Trinet database, a detailed,
establishment-level dataset covering all US ﬁrms (Voigt, 1993). Table 1
shows how this measure correlates to an SIC measure in which industry
pairs in the same three-digit SIC code are given a value of 3, industries in the
same two-digit SIC code are given a value of 2, and industries in different
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Table 1. Correlation between SIC Distances and Actual Patterns of
Diversiﬁcation.
SIC
Distance
Actual Combinations
1981 1983 1985 1987
SIC distance Pearson
correlation
1
Sig. (two-tailed)
N
Actual
combinations
1981
Pearson
correlation
0.320(**) 1
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.000
N 122,105 122,105
Actual
combinations
1983
Pearson
correlation
0.327(**) 0.941(**) 1
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.000 0.000
N 133,868 113,061 133,868
Actual
combinations
1985
Pearson
correlation
0.322(**) 0.895(**) 0.930(**) 1
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 126,993 96,707 109,232 126,993
Actual
combinations
1987
Pearson
correlation
0.338(**) 0.834(**) 0.857(**) 0.889(**) 1
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 12,5297 58,897 64,325 67,728 125,297
N refers to the number of four-digit industry pairs actually combined inside a ﬁrm. QA :5
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two-digit industries are given a value of 1. As seen in the table, the cor-
relation between observed diversiﬁcation patterns and the SIC-based relat-
edness measure is surprisingly low, ranging from 0.32 to 0.338. More
detailed analysis also shows that some of the most frequently combined
industry pairs are not related according to the SIC system. For example, the
most frequently combined industries, Ofﬁces of Physicians (8011) and Out-
patient Care Facilities (8081), do not share the same three-digit SIC code,
though they are obviously closely related businesses. Other industry pairs in
the top 1% in terms of observed combinations are not even in the same two-
digit SIC code, such as Deep Sea Foreign Transportation (4411) and Freight
Transportation Arrangement (4723), and Wood Cabinets for Television
(2517) and Radio, Phonography and Cathode Ray Television Tubes (3672).
Conversely, many industry pairs sharing a three-digit SIC code were never
once combined during this period. This raises not only theoretical, but also
empirical, concern about the reliability of SIC-based measures.
The FTC classiﬁcation system was used in several studies published in the
1980s and early 1990s (Chatterjee, 1986; Elgers & Clark, 1980; Lubatkin,
1983, 1987; Seth, 1990a, b; Park, 2003), but the FTC’s Large Merger Series
was discontinued in 1979. The FTC classiﬁed mergers as horizontal if the
merging ﬁrms were in the same product market, product extension if there
were functional similarities in production or distribution (without direct
competition), market extension if the parties sold similar products in dif-
ferent geographical markets, vertical if the ﬁrms were actual or potential
trading partners, and other/conglomerate if none of these conditions held.
Most studies using these classiﬁcations collapsed the categories into hor-
izontal, vertical, and conglomerate, or simply related and conglomerate.7
These measures unfortunately suffer from the same problems as those based
on SIC codes. Moreover, as the FTC classiﬁcations cannot be converted
into continuous measures, they are also less ﬂexible. Finally, the reliability
of the FTC’s classiﬁcations depends on the judgment of the FTC’s staff.
Because we know little about how these judgments were rendered, it is
impossible to verify the means used to classify complex mergers into mu-
tually exclusive categories.
4. VALUE APPROPRIATION AND RELATEDNESS
Our argument so far is that relatedness is likely to create value only when
speciﬁc conditions are present, and that existing measures of relatedness do
not adequately capture these conditions. To understand acquirer returns,
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Relatedness and Acquirer Performance 15
however, we must focus not only on value creation, but also value appro-
priation. Barney (1988) argued that acquirers (of any type) can earn supra-
normal returns only when the market for corporate control is not perfectly
competitive. This could occur if a particular bidder and target make a
unique combination and if the source of this unique value is not easily
imitated. Alternatively, the bidder may have private information about the
value of the combined ﬁrm.8 Finally, bidders can appropriate value if the
number of targets is larger than the number of bidders.
Are these conditions more likely to hold when bidder and target are
related? First, consider the case in which a particular combination of ﬁrms
creates unique value that is not easily imitated. We assume that unrelated
acquirer–target pairs seek value creation opportunities associated with ge-
neric resources, while related acquirer–target pairs seek value creation op-
portunities associated with speciﬁc resources. Montgomery and Wernerfelt
(1988, p. 625) argue that generic resources ‘‘normally yield less advantage
because they are in wider supplyy [M]any ﬁrms have the opportunity to
develop factors that apply to many different industries (e.g., teams of gen-
eral managers), whereas fewer ﬁrms have natural opportunities to create
more speciﬁc factors (e.g., teams of biochemists).’’ This suggests that the
equalizing forces are stronger with respect to generic factors, and conse-
quently that generic factors tend to be more evenly distributed across ﬁrms
than speciﬁc factors. Because unique value creation opportunities requires
heterogeneity, bidders pursuing related targets are more likely to be able to
generate unique value than bidders pursuing unrelated targets. Moreover,
bidders pursuing related targets can often realize the gains associated with
the target’s generic resources, while bidders pursuing unrelated targets can-
not realize the gains associated with the target’s speciﬁc resources, giving
related bidders an edge in bidding contests. For these reasons, we expect
unique and inimitable value creation opportunities to be more likely for
related bidders, and that the bidding process should systematically select for
such bidders when they are present.
Next, consider the case of private information about opportunities to
create value. The likelihood of discovering such opportunities should be
increasing in the acquirer’s knowledge about the target ﬁrm and its markets,
and ﬁrms in related industries – possibly with overlapping technology, cus-
tomers or suppliers – are likely to know more about the target ﬁrm and its
markets. Put differently, private knowledge about opportunities for value
creation is more likely to be discovered by ﬁrms in a related industry.
Finally, consider the relative number of bidders and targets. The bidder’s
bargaining position is strongest when there are more targets than bidders.
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The more generic the source of the value creation opportunity with the
target, the fewer the restrictions on the number of potential bidders. The
bidder could essentially come from any industry. Consequently it becomes
more likely that many bidders will be competing for the same target. Con-
versely, if the value creation opportunity derives from the speciﬁc resources,
the number of potential bidders is likely to be smaller. In addition, it is
possible that a value creation opportunity based on speciﬁc resources can be
realized with several (or all) ﬁrms in the target industry, while a value cre-
ation opportunity of a more generic type may only be relevant for a par-
ticular target (with particular needs or shortcomings). The point here is that
the ratio of potential bidders to potential targets should tend to be higher in
unrelated transactions.
For these reasons, the conditions speciﬁed by Barney (1988) as necessary
for acquirers to appropriate value are more likely to obtain when acquirers
are pursuing related targets. Of course, these advantages are mitigated by
the market for corporate control, so at least some related acquirers will not
earn abnormal returns. Still, we expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship be-
tween acquirer returns and relatedness, given that relatedness is properly
measured.
5. PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
5.1. An Alternative Measure of Relatedness
It is one thing to criticize discrete measures based on SIC codes or FTC
categories, another to provide a better one. We propose as a possible can-
didate the survivor-based measure that produced the patterns of diversiﬁ-
cation summarized Table 1. As described above, this procedure measures
relatedness by comparing the observed combinations of activities within
ﬁrms to what one would expect if diversiﬁcation patterns were random.
Here the knowledge of local decision makers and the screening function of
competitive markets reveal what activities are related. Moreover, such a
measure is both holistic and ﬂexible, holistic in the sense that it captures all
aspects of relatedness relevant for performance, including the conditions
speciﬁed in Section 2 above, and ﬂexible in the sense that it allows the causes
of relatedness to vary from case to case. Of course, the survivor-based ap-
proach assumes that local decision makers possess the relevant information
and incentives to make good decisions about resource combinations and/or
that the competitive selection process effectively corrects for errors. How-
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Relatedness and Acquirer Performance 17
ever, attempts to evaluate the survivor-based approach empirically ﬁnd it
better than SIC-based schemes in a variety of dimensions (Lien & Klein,
2004, 2005).
Another concern is that by allowing the market to determine what ac-
tivities are related, we are left not knowing precisely what relatedness is in
each speciﬁc case (a limitation shared by SIC-based procedures). Neverthe-
less, such an approach may still reveal what relatedness does, in how it
affects other variables of interest, such as acquirer returns in mergers and
acquisitions.
The discussion above suggests the following two hypotheses:
H1. Relatedness will not be positively associated with acquirer returns
when relatedness is measured with SIC distances.
H2. Relatedness will be positively associated with acquirer returns when
relatedness is measured with the survivor-based approach.
5.2. Methods
To test these hypotheses we ﬁrst calculate a survivor-based measure of
relatedness for all US industry pairs using the AGSM/Trinet Large Estab-
lishment Database (Trinet). The Trinet database contains records of all US
establishments with more than 20 employees, including variables such as
four-digit SIC code, corporate ownership, and sales. By aggregating the
establishments for each parent in each four-digit SIC code, and the different
four-digit SIC codes for each parent, and different parents for each four-
digit SIC industry, we get a comprehensive picture of diversiﬁcation patterns
in the US economy. Comparison with the Census of Manufacturers indicate
that Trinet contains 95% of all establishments it should (Voigt, 1993), and
that omissions are most likely for small ﬁrms (which are less likely to be
diversiﬁed).
Following Teece et al. (1994) we use the following procedure: Let K be the
number of diversiﬁed ﬁrms in the economy. Let Jij be a count of how often
industries i and j are actually combined within the same ﬁrm. Jij will be
larger if industries i and j are related, but will also increase with the number
of ﬁrms in the two industries (ni and nj) To remove the effect of the size of
industries i and j, the number Jij is compared with the number of expected
combinations if diversiﬁcation patterns were random. The random diver-
siﬁcation hypothesis can be operationalized as a hypergeometric situation
where a sample of size ni is drawn (without replacement) from a population
of K ﬁrms. Those chosen are considered active in industry i. A second
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independent sample of size nj is then drawn from the population of K ﬁrms.
Those chosen are considered active in industry j. The number xij of ﬁrms
active in both i and j is then a hypergeometric random variable with pop-
ulation K, special members ni and sample size nj. The distribution function
for this variable is then:
PrðX ij ¼ xÞ ¼ f hgðx; K ; ni; njÞ ¼
ni
x
 
K  ni
nj  x
 !
K
nj
 !
The mean and variance of Xij are
mij ¼ EðX ijÞ ¼
ninj
K
s2 ¼ mij 1
ni
K
  K
K  1
 
A standardized measure of the relatedness between industries i and j is then
constructed based on the difference between Jij and mij in the following
fashion:
Survivor Relatednessij ¼
Jij  mij
sij
The measure Survivor Relatednessij is thus a standardized measure of how
much actual combinations exceed expected combinations under the random
diversiﬁcation hypothesis.9
Next, we draw a sample of transactions from the Thompson/SDC Plat-
inum database from 1982 to 1985. We include only those transactions in
which the acquirer acquires full ownership, both acquirer and target are
listed in Compustat, the transaction has an ‘‘effective date’’ (to ensure it was
completed), acquirer and target are have different primary four-digit SIC
codes, and data are available from CRSP to compute cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs). This yields 72 transactions.
We calculate Acquirer CAR and Target CAR using a [30, +30] event
window and the CRSP equally weighted index as the market proxy. SIC
Relatedness is calculated as follows: if the two ﬁrms share the same primary
three-digit SIC code, a value of 3 is assigned; if they share the same primary
two-digit SIC code, a value of 2 is assigned; and if they are in different
primary two-digit SIC codes, a value of 1 was assigned. The variable Sur-
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vivor Relatedness uses the logic presented above to assign a survivor-based
measure of the relatedness between the parties’ primary businesses. Note
that we use the survivor-based measure for only 1981 and 1983 in our study
(AGSM/Trinet data is only available biannually). To mitigate endogeneity
the 1981 measures are used for merger announcements in 1982 and 1983,
and the 1983 measures for announcements in 1984 and 1985.
Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations for the key
variables. The sample has a mean Target CAR of 0.29 and, a mean Acquirer
CAR of 0.02, comparable to ﬁgures reported in other studies covering the
same period.
5.3. Findings
Table 3 reports a series of standardized OLS regressions of Acquirer CAR
on measures of relatedness. Model 1 uses only Target CAR as a regressor;
we interpret its coefﬁcient as a proxy for the premium paid to selling share-
holders. The coefﬁcient is positive, but not statistically significant. Model 2
adds SIC Relatedness. Adding this variable does not improve the model
significantly; the coefﬁcient on SIC Relatedness is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, nor is the F value for the regression itself. This is consistent with
Hypothesis 1, the claim that acquirer returns are unrelated to relatedness,
when relatedness is measured using SIC distances.
Model 3 substitutes Survivor Relatedness for SIC Relatedness, leading to a
substantial improvement in the model. The coefﬁcient on Survivor Relat-
edness is positive and statistically significant and the F value is also signif-
icant. We interpret this as evidence for Hypothesis 2, the acquirer returns
are positively related to survivor-based relatedness. Finally, in model 4 we
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Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlation Coefﬁcients
(n ¼ 72).
Mean SD Target CAR SIC Relatedness Survivor Relatedness
Acquirer CAR –0.02 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.27
Target CAR 0.29 0.31 1 0.10 0.01
SIC Relatedness 1.40 0.68 1 0.47
Survivor Relatedness 12.57 16.26 1
*po0.1; QA :6po0.5;
po0.01.
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include both SIC Relatedness and Survivor Relatedness to see if the two
measures capture different, complementary aspects of relatedness. However,
adding SIC Relatedness lowers the F- and adjusted R2-values and the SIC
variable itself is not statistically significant. Hence SIC Relatedness does not
seem to add useful information not already captured by Survivor Related-
ness. Put differently, the two measures appear to be substitutes, with Sur-
vivor Relatedness being the better measure.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our main point in this chapter is that the empirical literature on relatedness
and acquirer returns is affected by limitations in the way relatedness is
usually measured. Conventional measures are inconsistent with underlying
theories about how relatedness can increase value, and our preliminary em-
pirical work shows that an alternative measure of relatedness – one that
accounts for the complexity of factors determining the value of relatedness –
leads to different results.
Of course, the empirical analysis presented here is merely suggestive and
does not constitute a thorough investigation of the relationship between
survivor-based relatedness and value creation. The analysis would beneﬁt
from the inclusion of additional control variables and a more detailed
breakdown of the business portfolios of the merging ﬁrms. Nonetheless, our
preliminary ﬁndings suggest that future research on mergers and acquisi-
tions should seek to incorporate more sophisticated measures of relatedness.
We think the survivor-based approach is one of the most promising alter-
natives.
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Table 3. Standardized Regressions on Acquirer CAR (n ¼ 72).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Target CAR 0.159 0.143 0.156 0.151
SIC Relatedness 0.167 0.052
Survivor relatedness 0.266 0.241
Adj R2 0.012 0.026 0.070 0.059
F 1.842 1.962 3.715 2.5
***po0.01. QA :7po0.1;
po0.5;
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NOTES
1. Throughout the paper we use the term ‘‘resources’’ to include both resources
and competences.
2. Because we are discussing diversifying acquisitions we ignore gains related to
increases in market share or improvements in market positioning. Such gains are
unlikely to come from acquisitions across industries. We also ignore here the ‘‘in-
ternal capital markets’’ explanation for unrelated acquisitions (Hubbard & Palia,
1999; Klein, 2001).
3. In this we include as a special case the situation where the resource in question
is a public input, so that excess capacity will always exist.
4. Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein (2005) describe this ability – organizing hetero-
geneous capital resources under conditions of Knightian uncertainty – as the key
characteristic of entrepreneurship.
5. Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) ﬁnd a positive and significant relationship
between acquirer performance and their continuous measure of relatedness.
6. The one-digit SIC level is usually disregarded because it is considered too highly
aggregated to convey any information about relatedness. We are unaware of any
studies using six-digit NAICS codes.
7. As pointed out by Seth (1990b) the FTC categories were collapsed in different
ways, making it hard to compare ﬁndings across studies.
8. Barney adds to this condition a requirement that the combination creates a
unique value. However, as long as the information about the ﬁrms’ combined value
is private, this requirement is not necessary – other potential bidders will not act on
information they do not have.
9. Note that this is the same measure we termed Actual Combinations in Table 1.
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